Plainly income is not the only or necessarily the best indicator of material standard of living. Using data from the new Household, Income and Labor Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) Survey, this paper estimates the combined effects of disposable income and wealth (net worth) on measures of subjective well-being and ill-being. The analysis indicates that objective economic circumstances have considerably greater impact on subjective outcomes than previously believed.
We stress that this paper assesses the impact of economic circumstances on illbeing (or psychological distress) as well as well-being (or happiness). So far as we know, it is the first paper which imports into economics a key result from the psychological literature, namely that well-being and ill-being are distinct dimensions and not opposite ends of the same dimension (Bradburn, 1969; Diener, 1984; Diener et al, 1999; Headey Kelley and Wearing, 1993; Headey and Wearing, 1992) . The issue here is whether objective economic circumstances do more to promote well-being, or relieve ill-being, or have about the same impact on both. Our results provide most support for the third alternative.
Economic and Psychological Theory
Until very recently, the two major social science literatures on happiness and well-being -the economic literature on utility and the psychological literature on SWBsteadfastly ignored each other. Welfare economists learn not to measure utility directly, but instead to infer it from behavior. Following Samuelson (1938) , the standard approach is to treat behaviors as 'revealed preferences'. Utility is viewed as involving trade-offs between work and leisure. Work is regarded as pain but provides the wherewithal for consumption, while leisure is regarded as pleasure. Individuals are viewed as making different trade-offs, depending on their preferences for consumption and leisure, but essentially a happy person is seen as someone with a full shopping basket and lots of free time; a rather hedonistic view.
In psychology the study of happiness or subjective well-being is a fairly new topic (Argyle, 1987; Diener, 1984; Diener et al, 1999; Headey and Wearing, 1992; Veenhoven, 1984) . Psychologists have traditionally followed a medical model, seeing themselves as researchers and therapists dealing with the causes and cures of pathologies, and not taking much interest in what may have been seen as the light-weight topic of happiness.
Empirical research on well-being began in the late 1960s and 1970s at the Universities of Chicago (Bradburn, 1969 and Michigan (Andrews and Withey, 1976; Campbell, Converse and Rodgers, 1976) . The early studies made two 'discoveries', which are still debated but are accepted by the large majority of researchers. These discoveries, if correct, are of great importance to economists:
• Well-being (or happiness) and ill-being (or psychological distress) are empirically distinct dimensions with different causes; they are not opposite ends of the same dimension. Well-being comprises life satisfaction and positive feelings (e.g., joy, vitality), or what psychologists call positive affects. Ill-being comprises anxiety, depression and other negative affects. There is much evidence that people can experience both high levels of well-being and also quite high levels of anxiety at the same time (but not depression; see Headey, Kelley and Wearing (1993) .
• Economic variables, notably income, appear to have little effect on either wellbeing or ill-being. This is part of a more general finding that objective circumstances of all kinds (gender, age, employment status etc) have only modest effects on subjective outcomes. Well-being turns out to be much more affected by personality traits, personal relationships and social participation, and ill-being by personality problems, marital problems, job problems (including unemployment) and self-assessed health.
In the last five years or so economists have begun to take an interest in the psychological literature. A landmark piece, 'What can economists learn from the literature on happiness?' (Frey and Stutzer, 2002) appeared in the Journal of Economic Literature, setting out the case for measuring well-being/utility directly and reviewing recent research on the effects of income, unemployment, inflation and institutions on well-being (see also Oswald, 1997 ).
An important motivation for the recent interest among economists in psychological theories and results relating to well-being is a concern that the 'revealed preferences' approach may be open to challenge. This approach depends on the assumption that people's preferences for goods and leisure are exogenously determined (given, fixed, chosen by them). If preferences are exogenous and relatively fixed, then it can be inferred that increases in supply will increase utility. However, there is a countertheory. Duesenberry (1949) proposed that preferences are to a large extent endogenous; that people change their preferences in response to what others have and want ('keeping up with the Jones's' is one symptom). If this is so, then one cannot reasonably infer that more goods and leisure, preferred at time t, will necessarily increase utility if acquired at time t+1. Easterlin's (1974) famous paper, referred to earlier, appeared to support Duesenberry's theory by showing that, in so far as income affects happiness at all, it is relative income -one's income relative to others in one's own country -and not absolute gains in income that make a difference. A recent issue of the Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization (July, 2001 ; see especially Hollaender, ) was devoted to the debate about whether preferences are exogenous or endogenous, and the major implications for welfare economics of accepting the latter standpoint (see also Frank, 1985) .
Some economists might concede that, while it might be desirable to measure utility directly, it cannot be done in a reasonably valid way. Economists have been trained to the view that it is impossible to make interpersonal comparisons of utility. Can anyone really believe, they ask, that a person who scores 80 on a survey measure of satisfaction (e.g. with a bundle of goods and services) can really be said to be more satisfied than someone who scores 70 or 75? Psychologists who have developed measures of wellbeing might reply that, taken literally, no-one does believe that. But, they might reply, do economists literally believe that someone who reports an income of $80,000 in a survey or a tax return really has a higher income than someone who reports $70,000 or $75,000?
What the psychologists claim is that, in general, the people who score higher on satisfaction scales are more satisfied than people who score lower, and 'in general' is all that is needed for statistical analysis or, one might add, for business and governmental decision-making.
A limitation of the recent work in economics is a lack of recognition that wellbeing is probably better regarded as multi-dimensional, not unidimensional. To date those economists who have reported results involving direct measurement of well-being have usually conceptualized it as 'satisfaction'; either life satisfaction or satisfaction with one's material standard of living or financial situation. So far as we know, no previous research has investigated the impact of economic circumstances on ill-being, as well as well-being.
The basic framework for this paper is set out in Figure 1 In Figure 1 an arrow is shown running from the economic measures to the subjective outcomes. This arrow should not be taken too seriously. It is perfectly possible that subjective well-being and ill-being affect economic circumstances, as well as viceversa. Happy people are probably nicer to work with and thus may earn more money, other things equal.
DATA AND METHODS
The HILDA Survey, Waves 1 and 2 differences between the sample's characteristics and population Census characteristics.
The data include weights to 'correct' for these biases. The Wave 1 unit record data are publicly available for a nominal fee ($75) and can be obtained by applying for a data license. The application forms are available on the HILDA Survey web site. The Wave 2 data are yet to be publicly released. The Wave 2 data used here are thus based on a preliminary data set that is still subject to further cleaning and modification.
working age (25-59 years) at 30 June 2001, reducing the final sample to 7068
observations. These latter exclusions are justified on the grounds that the economic concerns of younger people and retirees tend to be quite different from the prime age group. Younger people typically do not expect to earn much -many are still in education -and retirees, being mostly not in paid work, care primarily about their superannuation assets and pension income.
Cross-sectional weights have been used in reporting means and standard deviations, and for making 'predictions' about the impact of economic circumstances on SWB. As is usual, weights were not used in regression analyses.
Measures

Subjective well-being and ill-being
Two indicators of subjective well-being were used and two of ill-being. The well-being indicators were single item measures of 'overall life satisfaction' and 'satisfaction with your financial situation'. The ill-being measures were a 5-item scale based on the mental health sub-scale included in the SF-36 Health Survey and a measure of 'financial stress' based on a single question about 'difficulty in making ends meet'. 2 It should be noted that, both for well-being and ill-being, one measure relates to the concept defined very broadly and one relates specifically to the economic/financial domain of life.
The concept of life satisfaction is perhaps closest to what welfare economists say they mean by utility (it is the definition in textbooks), and it is the concept employed in nearly all the recent studies by economists who have chosen to measure utility directly.
On the other hand, 'satisfaction/dissatisfaction with your financial situation', or satisfaction/dissatisfaction with material standards of living, seem to be the outcomes most likely to result from the variables that are actually included in most welfare economics equations and from the variables measuring family economic circumstances, which are our focus here.
Life satisfaction and financial satisfaction were both measured by single questions scored on a 0-10 scale. Only the extreme values were labeled, with a score of 0 described 2
The exact wording of this item was as follows: Thinking of your household's total monthly income, is your household able to make ends meet … with great difficulty, with difficulty, with some difficulty, fairly easily, easily, very easily? A show card was used to highlight the six response options.
as 'totally dissatisfied' and a score of 10 as 'totally satisfied'. For ease of interpretation these scales -and the ill-being measures also -were rescored to run from 0 to 100. This means that the coefficients in regression results can be understood as showing the quasipercentage increases or decreases in well-being or ill-being that would result from one unit of change in the explanatory variable in question (net of the effects of other variables on the right hand side).
Clearly, single item scales are not the best measures of well-being available, but they are very widely used in international surveys and have been found to have acceptable levels of reliability and validity (Diener, et al, 1999, pp. 277-278 ). It appears that, in relation to life satisfaction in particular, human beings can make quick global judgments in survey interviews; judgments which pretty accurately summarise their feelings. The global judgments that individuals make about themselves are corroborated by external validity tests done with partners and friends . Judgments of life satisfaction prove to be reasonably stable; they have a test-retest reliability of around 0.6, which is about the same as standard tests of blood pressure.
The broad measure of ill-being included here -the SF-36 mental health scale -is based on questions about a spectrum of negative feelings: anxiety, depression, tension etc. Our domain specific measure of financial ill-being -'difficulty in making ends meet'
-has been widely used in international surveys and is known to correlate well with more detailed measures of consumption deprivation.
Wealth, income and consumption
Not much is known about household wealth in Australia. The Reserve Bank publishes a household balance sheet each year, but the numbers are derived from the National Accounts and other aggregate sources and are, to a considerable extent, residuals calculated after business assets (about which much is known) have been accounted for.
The wealth module included in Wave 2 of the HILDA Survey thus represents the first major attempt in Australia to measure wealth at the household level. Most of the questions about assets and debts were in fact asked at the household level and answered by one person on behalf of the entire household. The questions covered housing, incorporated and unincorporated businesses, equity-type investments (e.g., shares, managed funds) and cash-type investments (e.g., bonds, debentures), vehicles and collectibles (e.g. art works). However, some questions about assets and debts -those we felt could not be reported accurately by one person on behalf of all -were asked of individuals. These included superannuation, bank accounts, credit cards, HECS debt and other personal debt. In answering all questions, respondents were asked to give exact dollar amounts. However, bands were offered to those who could not provide a more exact estimate of their superannuation holdings; a particularly difficult topic.
Wealth is difficult to measure in surveys and, when it has been attempted overseas, has been associated with high item non-response rates and considerable underestimates of national wealth (if the National Accounts are taken as a benchmark). This last result is partly due to under-reporting and partly because the wealthiest 2% or so, who own a vastly disproportionate share, are invariably under-represented in surveys (Juster, Smith and Stafford, 1999) . Furthermore, an equal probability sample will always be poorly placed to measure wealth given wealth is so concentrated at one end of the The main measure of income used in this paper is household disposable income which, with a couple of adjustments (discussed below), is usually regarded as the best income-based measure of material standard of living. As with wealth, our measure is based on summing the incomes of all household members and implicitly assuming that resources are shared.
Use of Equivalence Scales and Logarithms
Obviously a small household with the same income as a large household would have a higher standard of living. So it is clearly necessary to make some adjustment for household size. The obvious way to do this is to calculate household per capita income, but this makes no allowance for economies of scale in larger households or for the fact that children are cheaper to keep than adults. The usual way to make the adjustment is to use an equivalence scale; a scale intended to assist measurement of standard of living by adjusting household income to needs. In this paper the equivalence scale we use is the socalled International Experts' Scale which represents a compromise among the wide range of scales explicitly or implicitly used by Western governments in running their social assistance programs (Buhmann et al, 1988) . Use of the scale requires dividing household 3 Wealth estimates will be imputed for the currently missing cases in time for the release of HILDA Wave 2 in early 2004.
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All results reported here should thus be regarded as preliminary. A disposable income variable that makes a more complete set of adjustments for taxation and government transfers is currently in preparation.
disposable income by the square root of household size. So a four-person household with a disposable income of $40,000 is deemed to have an equivalent income of $20,000.
Results are very close to those obtained for the current OECD scale of 1.0 for the first adult in a household, 0.5 for other adults and 0.3 for children.
Note that we did not equivalise wealth (net worth) because, for reasons unclear, equivalised wealth correlated with dependent variables much less strongly than the unequivalised variable.
A further measurement issue was whether to use logarithmic transformations of wealth and income in regression equations. Economists normally prefer to take logs of income-like measures because the distributions are usually lognormal rather than normal, due to small numbers of very rich people (in the right tail of the distribution). Inspection of the data for wealth indicated the necessity of a log transformation. However, equivalised disposable income has a more or less normal distribution, so a log transformation is not a statistical necessity. Empirically in Australia, and in other countries, equivalised income correlates a little more highly with measures of well-being and ill-being than the log of equivalised income. So on empirical grounds we did not take logs.
Choice of Survey Years
We had to make some compromises in choosing which years of survey data to use. Wealth was only collected in Wave 2, and although imputations for missing cases
are not yet available, there is no choice but to use data for that year. We checked that results were unaffected by inclusion in equations of a dummy variable for 'missingnon-missing'. Data on gross income was collected in both years, but missing data imputations have only been completed for Wave 1. Given that it would be odd to combine evidence for one year in which imputations have been made with evidence from a year without imputations, we only use the income data collected in Wave 1 (which relates to financial year 2000-01)
Given the situation with the independent variables, we decided that where possible our dependent variables should be the average (mean) of respondents' scores in both waves. We checked that the two-year means had slightly higher Pearson correlations with explanatory variables than the single year measures. So two-year means were used for 'life satisfaction', 'satisfaction with your financial situation' and the mental health scale. The question underlying the 'financial stress' measure was not asked in Wave 2;
hence we had no choice but to rely on data from Wave 1..
RESULTS
Basic Information: Wealth and Disposable Income
We begin with some evidence to assess how well HILDA's new household level wealth The comparable HILDA aggregates are:
• Financial assets of households: $0.994 trillion
• Non-financial assets of households, excluding vehicles 5 : $2.060 trillion.
• Total assets of households: $3.054 trillion (Pahl, 1989) . Wealth is much more unequally distributed than income, with a Gini coefficient of 0.59, compared with a Gini of 0.35 for equivalised disposable income.
It may seem surprising that the correlation between disposable income and wealth for these prime age adults was only 0.33. However, this is much the same as has been found for other Western countries and, in itself, a basis for suspecting that wealth and income may both make significant contributions to SWB.
Well-being
By international standards, Australians score high on well-being, with a mean score for this age group of 77.7 on the 0-100 scale. We also find that women are slightly more likely to report higher levels of life satisfaction than men (mean=78.3, compared with 77.1 for men), a result different from most other Western countries, but one that is found in all Australian studies that we have seen.
The Pearson correlations between measures of household economic circumstances and well-being give a first clue to the fact that we are going to find stronger relationships than in previous research. The simple correlations between equivalised disposable income and life satisfaction, and between income and financial satisfaction, are 0.11 and 0.30 respectively, very similar to what has been reported in previous research. However, the correlations with wealth are actually higher than for income; 0.18 for life satisfaction and 0.36 for financial satisfaction.
Of course these preliminary results could prove deceptive. We now assess the combined effects of wealth and income, and also control for other 'objective' characteristics of respondents. Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression was used, although it is recognized that, strictly speaking, the dependent variables are only ordinal scale. However, ordered probit equations gave results that were qualitatively the same, so like most previous researchers in the field of SWB, we preferred to give the more readily interpretable OLS results.
Using the evidence in Table 1 to reconsider the effects of objective economic circumstances on well-being, one is faced with the standard worry about whether to see the bottle as half empty or half full. Clearly the inclusion of wealth helps to account for more variance than just income by itself. Note also that the Betas (the standardized coefficients) for wealth are a little higher than for income in both equations. On the other hand, the combined effect of all 'objective' variables, including those measuring economic circumstances, is such as to account for just 8.3% of the variance in life satisfaction and a more solid 20.8% of the variance in the domain specific measure of financial satisfaction.
It should be recorded that results were very similar when the equations were estimated separately for men and women. Also, only minor differences were found when additional control variables were introduced. These included measures of occupational status and health disability, a missing data dummy variable for wealth, and a similar dummy for education.
In order to get a better handle on the key empirical issue, we now estimate differences in well-being that would result from being at sharply different points in the distributions of both wealth and income. Imagine two people, one at the 25 th percentile on both measures and one at the 75 th percentile. These people are quite far apart, but panel studies show that moving this far up or down the ladder is not uncommon over, say, a decade (Goodin, Headey, Muffels and Dirven, 1999) . Straightforward arithmetic, based Notes: a. Metric coefficients are shown for all explanatory variables. For income and wealth standardized coefficients (βs) are also given to assist comparisons of the relative importance of wealth and income as determinants of well-being. *** significant at .001 level; ** significant at .01; *significant at .05; ns = not significant.
The reference variable for education was 'completed year 12' and the reference variable for employment status was 'not in the labour force'.
on the evidence in Table 1 , shows that a person who moved up the 'economic ladder' by these 50 steps would gain 2.4 percentiles on the life satisfaction scale and 8.2 percentiles on the financial satisfaction scale. Conversely someone who dropped 50 rungs on the ladder would drop by these percentiles. The gains and losses would be about equally due to wealth and disposable income. The 2.4 percentile gain in life satisfaction would be 1.3 percentiles due to wealth and 1.1 due to income. The 8.2 percentiles gain in financial satisfaction breaks down into 4.2 percentiles due to income and 4.0 due to wealth.
Continuing with the issue of whether the bottle is half empty or half full, similar calculations show that moving 50 percentiles up the economic ladder brings less than half the gain in life satisfaction that comes from getting married (which brings a gain of 5.7 percentiles), but is better than getting married as a means of increasing financial satisfaction, although getting married is not bad for that either (gain = 4.7 percentiles).
Another comparison can be made with unemployment. Getting a job increases life satisfaction 3.0 percentiles and increases financial satisfaction by 11.1 percentiles; both these gains are somewhat larger than the effects of moving up the economic ladder. On the other side of the ledger, moving up or down the economic ladder makes a far bigger difference than is found between women and men (women are a little happier, as noted above), between older and younger people (older people are a little happier), or between homeowners and tenants (homeowners are happier).
It is clear that as a determinant of well-being, wealth is at least as important as income. Indeed, assuming it is not as well measured (which usually has the effect of attenuating statistical relationships), wealth is probably more important. It is worth asking which components of wealth make most difference to well-being. More detailed analyses showed that, in Australia, housing and superannuation assets are the two significant components. By themselves other specific types of assets and debts are not significant at the 5% level. However, the most highly aggregated measure -the measure of net worth used in Table 1 -has the strongest relationship with all subjective outcomes.
Ill-being
Australians averaged 73.8 on the 0-100 SF-36 standardised mental health scale.
This not a high score by international standards and indicates fairly high levels of anxiety and stress. Australia, like Sweden and the United States, is in fact a country that has high average ratings on well-being and fairly high ratings on ill-being. Australian women have slightly lower mental health score men and feel a slightly greater sense of financial stress.
The mental health result may seem odd in view of the fact that women score higher on life satisfaction, but is in fact in line with previous findings (e.g., Headey and Wearing, 1992; Henderson et al, 1981) . The usual result of gender comparisons is that women score higher on both positive emotions (positive affect) and negative emotions (negative affect). They are both more up and more down than men. Ratings on the 'financial stress' scale averaged 32.7, with a total of 40.3% reporting that they had 'great difficulty', 'difficulty' or 'some difficulty' in making ends meet.
The Pearson correlations of wealth and income with mental health were, respectively, 0.18 and 0.12. This is the same pattern as the correlations with life satisfaction and again suggests that wealth matters to subjective outcomes at least as much as income. The correlations with the domain specific measure of 'financial stress'
were, as expected, higher at -0.29 and -0.38.
Table 2 now provides the evidence for assessing the net effects of wealth and income on ill-being. In most respects these ill-being results run parallel to the well-being results. Again, wealth and income both contribute significantly to the more general measure of mental health, but have much stronger effects on the domain specific measure of perceived financial stress. The standardized Betas imply that wealth may have more effect on mental health than income, but less on financial stress.
Let us now use the results in Table 2 to estimate the effects of changes in economic circumstances on ill-being. Moving from the 25 th to the 75 th percentiles of both wealth and income would (inferentially) improve one's mental health by 1.9 percentiles and reduce one's perceived financial stress by 11.8 percentiles. The gain in mental health would be more due to wealth than income (1.2 percentiles compared to 0.7 for income), while the decline in financial stress would be primarily due to the gain in income and less to wealth (8.0 compared to 3.8 percentiles). Finally, we may note that improvements in economic circumstances of the magnitude envisaged would appear likely to have a greater impact in reducing ill-being than the other major life changes, including getting married and getting a job after a period of unemployment.
Well-being and Ill-being: Putting it Together
We now attempt to give an overview comparing and, in a sense, combining results for well-being and ill-being. The underlying issue is whether economic circumstances matter more for well-being or ill-being, and this involves developing a model to estimate the total effects of the economic variables on subjective outcomes.
A preliminary and simplistic way of tackling this issue is simply to compare the Pearson correlations given earlier for well-being and ill-being. These suggest that economic circumstances, unlike many other factors, contribute just about exactly equally to well-being and ill-being. The correlations with life satisfaction for wealth and disposable income were 0.18 and 0.11, while the respective correlations with mental health were 0.18 and 0.12. The standardized regression coefficients (βs) in Tables 1 and 2 also suggested that the combined effects of wealth and income were about the same on well-being as ill-being. In this model, substantial variance is accounted for in both life satisfaction (27%) and mental health (14%). The effects of wealth and income are, however, totally indirect via domain specific perceptions of financial satisfaction and financial stress. Estimates of direct links between wealth and income and the more global measures of well-being and ill-being were not significant even at the 5 per cent level.
Taken at face value, the model suggests that economic circumstances may have more effect in promoting well-being than relieving ill-being. However, this result must be regarded as open to doubt, given that financial satisfaction (on the well-being side) is probably better measured than financial stress (on the ill-being side). Also, mental health may not be the most appropriate general measure of ill-being. A measure of anxiety might be more strongly related both to objective economic circumstances and to perceived financial stress.
DISCUSSION
This paper has shown that objective economic circumstances matter a good deal more to well-being and ill-being or, one can loosely say, to happiness than previously believed.
Wealth (net worth) appears to matter at least as much as income, so its inclusion changes our picture of the importance of economics to well-being. Wealth is probably important because it provides economic security, which many people value highly. Future work may well show that other measures of living standards, including consumption, have significant additional effects. This is not to claim that previous research was wrong in emphasising that personality and personal relationships are more important to well-being and ill-being than material factors. But the unimportance of material circumstances has been exaggerated, largely as a consequence of omitting all variables bar income. In many cases, too, researchers have relied on measures of pre-tax, pre-transfer income -rather than equivalised disposable income -and so have omitted the main effects of government policy in redistributing income and potentially redistributing well-being and ill-being.
Arguably, our results have implications both for the psychology literature on happiness and for welfare economics. The implications for psychology are obvious and just involve a modified understanding of what matters to well-being and ill-being. The implications for economics are more subtle. If the 'revealed preferences' approach survives the challenges it currently faces, then research on happiness will presumably remain on the fringe of economics. If, on the other hand, it comes to be accepted by increasing numbers of economists that gains in utility cannot be validly inferred from gains in consumption and leisure, then issues will arise about the direct measurement of utility/happiness. It will then be comforting to know that household living standardsand therefore, by inference, national economic growth -matter quite substantially to utility/happiness.
